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I. Introduction 
Impossible attempts were first officially recognized as non-criminal in 
1864.1 Not that they needed official recognition. Because “[t]he easiest cases 
don’t even arise,”2 that 1864 ruling literalized what then had to be a given: a 
person whose anti-social bent poses no appreciable risk of harm is no criminal.  
Over 150 years later, scholarly output on the subject persists,3 marked by 
thoughtful takes on the inner and outer worlds and an odd preoccupation with 
“imaginative hypotheticals”4 like “Lady Eldon,”5 a difficulty as unlikely to arise 
                                                
1 Regina v. Collins, 169 Eng. Rep. 1477 (Crown Cases Reserved 1864). 
2 K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.). 
3 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 2 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 11.5 & n.1 (2016). 
4 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 27.07, at 399 (7th ed. 
2015); see Peter Westen, Impossibility Attempts: A Speculative Thesis, 5 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 523, 524 (2008) (scholars fixed on “fanciful hypotheticals”). 
5 Lady Eldon smuggled English lace in from the continent, taking it in error to be 
contraband French lace. See Audrey Rogers, Protecting Children on the Internet: 
Mission Impossible?, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 323, 347-48 (2009) (Lady Eldon is 
“mental gymnastics” for first-year students). 
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in the experience of lawyers as it was in 1912 when Wharton cooked it up.6 To 
reassure myself the subject doesn’t “smell of the lamp,”7 before undertaking this 
Essay I tapped “impossibility” into Westlaw, which designated nearly 1500 
criminal cases as on point, 900 or so more recent than 1999. From that I take it 
that impossible attempts are not, as some courts and commentators have 
insinuated, merely a professorial hobby horse.8 Instead, impossible attempts 
express a non-trivial tension between risk-taking and harm-causing within the 
very real world of criminal litigation.  
Impossibility also merits continued study because it seemingly began to 
erode as a defense to a charge of attempt as soon as 15 years after its 1864 
discovery.9 Now it is hornbook that impossible attempts are punishable as 
crimes.10 Specifically,  
[t]hirty-seven states have explicitly eliminated impossibility as a 
defense to a charge of attempt and the federal circuits that have not 
done likewise have so limited the range of application of the 
defense as to render it virtually a dead letter. As a result, one’s 
                                                
6 1 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 225, n.8 (James M. Kerr ed., 11th ed. 1912). 
7 Loughney v. Hickey, 635 F.2d 1063, 1071 (3rd Cir. 1980) (Adisert, J., 
concurring). 
8 Commonwealth v. Bell, 853 N.E.2d 563, 564-65 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006); see 
Neil P. Cohen, Teaching Criminal Law: Curing the Disconnect, 48 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 1195, 1197-98 (2004) (as county prosecutor, author saw many assault cases, 
but never “such esoterica as impossible attempts”). 
9 See Edwin R. Keedy, Criminal Attempts at Common Law, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 
464, 484 n.122 (1954).  
10 See PAUL H. ROBINSON, 1 CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES §§ 85(a), at 423 & 85(c), 
at 427-31 (1984 & Supp. 2016).  
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susceptibility to punishment for attempting the impossible is today 
a rather uncontroversial matter of settled law.11 
 
Beyond the rhetoric that impossibility is no longer a defense,12 that it still 
has a place in the law of attempt was evident in the digests and law reviews 
long before Graham Hughes touted it 50 years ago as an area that repays 
close study.13 Agreement that the impossibility defense has a way of 
rehabilitating itself from criticism continues. What continues more 
precisely is a sense of a non-trivial difference between failing at larceny by 
picking the empty pocket of a passerby on a sidewalk and by picking the 
empty pocket of a mannequin in a department store. What remains up in the 
air is what accounts for that difference. Despite two absolutist positions on 
this – 1) impossibility is a defense to a charge of attempt; and 2) no it is not 
a defense – we have a lingering sense that some cases should come out one 
way and some another. But because we have evolved no language to 
account for the difference, we live in a state of uneasiness about it. 
Here I rehearse an argument meant to help decode the impossibility 
                                                
11 John Hasnas, Once More unto the Breach: The Inherent Liberalism of the 
Criminal Law and Liability for Attempting the Impossible, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 3 
(2002). 
12 See Note, John F. Preis, Witch Doctors and Battleship Stalkers: The Edges of 
Exculpation in Entrapment Cases, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1869, 1896-98 & 1896 
n.164 (1999) (factual and hybrid if not legal impossibility are no longer 
defenses). 
13 Graham Hughes, One Further Footnote on Attempting the Impossible, 42 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1005, 1005 (1967).   
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defense by “hounding down the minutiae”14 of what it means to make a 
mistake. I am certainly not the first to insist that the impossibility defense 
lives on.15 I am, however, the first to base such a claim on the grammar or 
criteria of mistakes, which can get us closer to the bottom of what makes 
attempts impossible and why it matters.  
Extant impossibility cases and scholarship take mistakes as a given. 
But what is a mistake? Is the answer considered too obvious to mention? 
Kenneth Simons, to take just one leading authority, has written 164 law-
review pages about mistakes of law and fact embedded in the impossibility 
defense,16 tossing in just once that a mistake is a sort of “perception” or 
“empirical judgment” at odds with the world.17 He does not elaborate. Nor 
do others engaged in like projects.18 
                                                
14 J.L. AUSTIN, A Plea for Excuses, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 175 (3d ed. 1979). 
15 E.g., Kyle Brodie, The Obviously Impossible Attempt, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 
237 (1995); Ken Levy, It’s Not Too Difficult: A Plea to Resurrect the 
Impossibility Defense, 45 N.M. L. REV. 225 (2014); Peter Westen, Impossibility 
Attempts: A Speculative Thesis, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 523 (2008). 
16 Kenneth W. Simons, Ignorance and Mistake of Criminal Law, Noncriminal 
Law, and Fact, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 487 (2012) (57 pages); Kenneth W. 
Simons, Mistake of Fact or Mistake of Criminal Law? Explaining and Defending 
the Distinction, 3 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 213 (2009) (35 pages); Kenneth W. Simons, 
Mistake and Impossibility, Law and Fact, and Culpability: A Speculative Essay, 
81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 447 (1990) (72 pages). 
17 Kenneth W. Simons, Mistake and Impossibility, Law and Fact, and 
Culpability: A Speculative Essay, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 447, 469 
(1990). 
18 See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Inculpatory and Exculpatory Mistakes and the 
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Within the “stock hypotheticals” of impossible attempts,19 a man 
shoots a tree stump or a corpse, each having been mistaken for a live 
person,20 or he administers to a live person an innocuous substance he has 
mistaken for poison.21 These stick-figure hypotheticals pose whether 
attempted murder has occurred. But because it is stipulated that each action 
owes to mistake, we are told so little about what happened that of course 
the question is hard to answer. Any chance of making sense of the 
hypotheticals is stymied by an absence both of facts and of any concern for 
what can count as a mistake. My contribution here to the considerable work 
of others is to locate the impossibility defense within an actual context of 
human action and concern, which is the only way we can become clear for 
ourselves what is a mistake and what is not. We will find the situations in 
which the law deploys the notion of mistake are not always situations in 
which we would find the use of that term natural or responsive to our 
                                                
Fact/Law Distinction: An Essay in Memory of Myke Bayles, 12 L. & PHIL. 33 
(1993); Gerald Leonard, Rape, Murder, and Formalism: What Happens if We 
Define Mistake of Law?, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 507 (2001). 
19 Lawrence Crocker, Justice in Criminal Liability: Decriminalizing Harmless 
Attempts, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057, 1102 (1992). 
20 See Edwin R. Keedy, Criminal Attempts at Common Law, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 
464, 467 (1954) (stump); Mihailis E. Diamantis, Corporate Criminal Minds, 91 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2049, 2070 (2016) (corpse). 
21 John Hasnas, Once More unto the Breach: The Inherent Liberalism of the 
Criminal Law and Liability for Attempting the Impossible, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 2 
& n.1 (2002). 
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human need to locate mistakes in the world. 
II. Exculpatory Mistakes 
Our interest in mistakes, like our interest in all excuses, is in assessing our 
responsibility for the harms we inflict on others. Like accidents, mistakes excuse 
unless the legislature intended otherwise, which, due to constitutional constraints, 
it may do only if the punishment for the offense is mild or the offense is not a 
malum in se (pre-legal) wrong.22 In other words, when accused of someone of 
doing something a good person would not do, the accused must be given a 
chance to elaborate the factual background against which the act occurred. It 
follows that accusations of being a “common thief”23 (a pre-legal wrong)24 or 
that threaten lengthy prison sentences (a proxy for a pre-legal wrong)25 oblige 
courts to hear the accused’s story about how the action misfired. In the telling of 
those stories, mistakes of fact generally excuse the accused, whereas mistakes of 
law generally do not.26 Likewise, with general-intent offenses, mistakes must be 
                                                
22 See Rosanna Cavallaro, A Big Mistake: Eroding the Defense of Mistake of Fact 
about Consent in Rape, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 815, 840-41 (1996). 
23 James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 251 (1961) (Whittaker, J., concurring in 
part & dissenting in part). 
24 See generally Andrew Comford, Preventive Criminalization, 18 NEW CRIM. L. 
REV. 1 (2015). 
25 See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994). 
26 See 4 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES 27 (1765-1769) (“For a mistake in point 
of Law, which every person of discretion . . . is bound and presumed to know, is 
in criminal cases no sort of defense”). 
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reasonable to get the accused off the hook, whereas with specific-intent offenses, 
so-called unreasonable mistakes suffice.27  
For example, self-defenders who unnecessarily but reasonably respond 
forcibly to perceived threats are mistaken about facts, which, if they were as 
perceived by self-defenders, would render the self-defensive actions 
noncriminal.28 The same can be said of accused rapists,29 whose mistake about 
the fact of consent negates the wrongfulness (though not harmfulness) of the 
act.30 And when age is an element of a crime, as in sex with a minor, a mistake of 
fact – taking a minor for an adult – excuses the accused.31  
An illustration of a plea of mistake of fact is the Arkansas Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Flippo v. State.32 Robert L. Flippo, Jr. and his son Bobby were 
hunting out of season in the woods of Lawrence County, Arkansas where, in the 
poor visibility of dusk, Bobby fatally shot Roy Ralph Sharp, a 225-pound man 
whom Bobby took for a deer from 140 yards away. Evidence suggested the fatal 
shot ricocheted off a low branch obscuring Sharp, whose death was hastened by 
the Flippos’ delay in summoning help. Properly understood, Bobby’s defense in 
                                                
27 See People v. Russell, 144 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1425-27 (6th Dist. 2006). 
28 See Commonwealth v. Scott, 73 A.3d 599 (Pa. 2013). 
29 See People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337 (Cal. 1975). 
30 See Thaddeus M. Pope, Balancing Public Health against Individual Liberty: 
The Ethics of Smoking Regulations, U. PITT. L. REV. 419, 452 & n.145 (2000).  
31 See People v. Hernandez, 393 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1964). 
32 Flippo v. State, 523 S.W.2d 390, 391-92 (Ark. 1975).  
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his manslaughter trial was that he shot Sharp by mistake. Concluding that 
Bobby’s aim was good, but that he aimed at and shot an improvident target, the 
jury convicted him for his gross negligence in hunting out of season from 
considerable distance when “not sure of his target.”33 Simply put, Bobby’s plea 
of mistake was rejected. Another way of saying this is that while Sharp might 
have been taken for a deer, he was not shot “by mistake.” For if he had been, 
there would be nothing to do but excuse Bobby for the killing.   
Bobby’s plea was based on a mistake about a fact – whether Sharp was 
man or deer. Absent an authoritative pronouncement of law in force before the 
act in question, mistakes of law are entertained as excuses only if the statute is 
specifically designed to that end.34 An example of such a statute is in Cheek v. 
United States,35 where an American Airlines pilot argued he did not “willfully 
evade taxes” because he owed no taxes, given his baseless belief that the Internal 
Revenue Code did not treat wages as income. Although mistake or ignorance of 
law is normally no excuse, in this case Congress had built the excuse into the 
                                                
33 Flippo v. State, 523 S.W.2d 390, 393 (Ark. 1975), citing State v. Green, 229 
P.2d 318 (Wash. 1951) (taking a 15-year-old boy with a red hat for either a bear 
or a “three-point buck” at 102 feet), citing State v. Newberg, 278 P. 568 (Or. 
1929) (taking a man on horseback for a deer at 125 feet). 
34 See United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Because theft 
involves property known to be that of another, it is excused if the accused takes 
under a claim of right based on permission, a gift, or abandonment. BALDWIN’S 
KENTUCKY REV. STATUTES § 514.020(1); cf. Picotte v. Mills, 203 S.W. 825, 826 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1918) (ownership is mixed question of law and fact).  
35 498 U.S. 192 (1991). 
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offense by requiring not just a failure to pay tax, but a willful failure, which 
could occur only with Cheek’s knowledge of his obligation to pay tax. Had 
Congress intended otherwise, the statute would refer merely to a failure to pay 
tax, not a willful failure. The Supreme Court agreed, “as incredible as such 
misunderstandings of and beliefs about the law might be.”36 The source of 
Cheek’s beliefs? A group of lawyers, who conducted seminars denouncing the 
federal tax system as unconstitutional and declaring wages as non-income.37 The 
high court’s solution was to order a new trial at which the trial court was barred 
from imposing a reasonableness requirement on Cheek’s beliefs about the 
Internal Revenue Code.38  
Although Flippo and Cheek are very different in one being about fact, one 
about law, that distinction conceals what they have in common. Notably absent 
                                                
36 Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 203-04 (1991). 
37 Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 195-96 (1991). 
38 On remand, after the pro se Cheek filed eccentric pre-trial motions, see United 
States v. Cheek, 1991 WL 287034 (N.D. Ill. 1991), the revised jury instruction 
permitted unreasonable beliefs to acquit, but told jurors they could judge the 
genuineness of a belief by its reasonableness. The Seventh Circuit upheld the 
subsequent re-conviction, see United States v. Cheek, 3 F.3d 1057, 1063 (7th Cir. 
1993), cert. den. Cheek v. United States, 510 U.S. 1112 (1994), after which 
Cheek was sentenced to 366 days in prison, which led American Airlines to deny 
him a leave of absence, instead firing him (after 20 years on the job) for his 
imminent unavailability to fly. Cheek lost a suit to get his job back, served six 
months in prison followed by three more in a Salvation Army half-way house in 
Chicago, and never worked for American again, a disposition evidently justified 
by the airline’s collective-bargaining agreement with its pilots. See Cheek v. 
American Airlines, 1995 WL 115510 (N.D. Ill. 1995), aff’d. 89 F.3d 838 (7th 
Cir. 1996), cert. den. 519 U.S. 993 (1996). 
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in both Flippo and Cheek is any consideration of why each believed what they 
did: who would take a man for a deer at 140 yards, or at any distance for that 
matter? Where were the target’s telltale antlers, tail, and spindly legs? And if 
wages aren’t income, then what are they? How can a pilot earn a big salary for 
two decades and continue to believe his wages aren’t income, even after 
repeatedly litigating the issue without success, once suffering Rule 11 sanctions 
to boot?39   
III. The Concept of Mistake and Its Limits 
Mistakes involve the idea of a wrong alternative – taking one thing for 
another or taking one tack rather than another.  
You have a donkey, so have I, and they graze in the same field. The 
day comes when I conceive a dislike for mine. I go to shoot it, draw 
a bead on it, fire: the brute falls in its tracks. I inspect the victim, and 
find to my horror that it is your donkey. I appear on your doorstep 
with the remains and say – what? ‘I say, old sport, I’m awfully sorry. 
I’ve shot your donkey by accident?’ Or ‘by mistake?’ Alternatively, 
I go to shoot my donkey as before, draw a bead on it, fire – but as I 
do so, the beasts move, and to my horror yours falls. Again the scene 
on the doorstep – what do I say, ‘by mistake’ or ‘by accident’?40  
 
With accidents, something befalls (“I didn’t mean to shoot a donkey – any 
donkey” – or “that was not the donkey I was aiming at”). With mistakes, you 
take the wrong one when you have both the competence and commitment to take 
                                                
39 See Cheek v. Doe, 828 F.2d 395 (7th Cir. 1987) (trial court sanction reduced 
from $11,500 to $5,000, increased by another $1,500 for frivolous appeal). 
40 J.L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 185 n.1 (3d ed. 
1979). 
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the right one (“I meant to shoot that donkey, but thought it was mine, not 
yours”). This last qualification is most important and most frequently overlooked 
in published decisions.  
Neither Cheek nor Flippo made a mistake, even though both took one 
thing for another. If getting things right is unlikely, guesswork, or random, then 
getting them wrong is not by mistake. Only if you have knowledge in the first 
place can your knowledge fail and count as a mistake as opposed to a wrong 
belief owing to something – carelessness, recklessness, fantasy, delusion – other 
than mistake. When you make a mistake, you mean to do exactly what you do, at 
least to a point. It is just that you misinterpret your situation: you take someone 
else’s property for yours, a minor for an adult, silence for consent, a harmless 
prank for a deadly threat. 
[S]uppose the order is ‘Right turn’ and I turn left: no doubt the 
sergeant will insinuate that my attention was distracted, or that I 
cannot distinguish my right from my left – but it was not and I can, 
this was a simple, pure mistake. As often happens. Neither I nor the 
sergeant will suggest that there was any accident, or any 
inadvertence either.41  
 
A mistake can be made only by someone who could have gotten it right, tried to 
get it right, but failed – not by someone who can get it right only randomly or 
cares little about getting it right. If our unfortunate soldier really didn’t know his 
left from his right, then his turning left cannot be something he did “by mistake.” 
                                                
41 J.L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 200 n.1, 201-02. 
(3d ed. 1979). 
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Again, if you tell me “fetch my umbrella,” and on seeing several in the 
designated area I grab an umbrella clueless as to which is yours, I am not 
mistaken if it turns out to be someone else’s.  
Two criteria for the correct deployment of our concept of mistake seem 
essential. First, for me to fetch the wrong umbrella by mistake, I would need a 
basis for knowing which one is yours. If I am merely guessing, then mistake 
drops out as a description of what goes wrong. Thus it would be eccentric for me 
to say “I made a mistake” after guessing the wrong lottery numbers. When 
success is only random, mistake is never the explanation of the unhappy 
outcome.  
Second, I must have a commitment to getting things right. Even if I have 
reason to know which umbrella is yours, if I grab just any old umbrella, then you 
might have been mistaken to rely on me to fetch it for you by taking me for 
considerate and careful. But my lack of commitment to take the right one 
precludes my explaining that I have taken the wrong umbrella by mistake. I 
cannot fail at something at which I have not even tried. 
Still, we must not be too finicky in establishing the criteria of mistakes, 
lest nothing would qualify and the word would cease to have any specific 
application in the world. An example of a too finicky notion of mistake is 
deployed by the sophist Thrasymachus, who challenges Socrates: 
[D]o you call a man who makes mistakes about the sick a doctor 
because of the very mistake he is making? Or a man who makes 
	 13	
mistakes in calculation a skilled calculator, at the moment he is 
making a mistake, in the very sense of his mistake? I suppose 
rather that this is just our manner of speaking – the doctor made a 
mistake, the calculator made a mistake, and the grammarian. But I 
suppose that each of these men, insofar as he is what we address 
him as, never makes mistakes. Hence, in precise speech, . . . none 
of the craftsmen makes mistakes. The man who makes mistakes 
makes them on account of a failure in knowledge and is in that 
respect no craftsman. So no craftsman, wise man, or ruler makes 
mistakes at the moment when he is ruling, although everyone 
would say that the doctor made a mistake and the ruler made a 
mistake.42 
  
To Thrasymachus, know-how fails whenever a mistake is made. When know-
how fails, he goes on, then the activity to which the know-how pertains ceases to 
occur. The craftsman (doctor, calculator, grammarian, ruler) no longer “is what 
we address him as” when he makes a mistake because if he really is a craftsman, 
then his knowledge will never fail. Because on that account knowledge is 
infallible, if you make a mistake you cannot have been acting “on the basis of 
your knowledge.” 
 On that account, someone who is not trained in medicine cannot make a 
medical mistake (thus the hilarity of the Sprite soft drink commercial that asks 
whether you would want a pro basketball player operating on you). Someone 
who is trained in medicine, contrariwise, cannot not make a mistake because 
medicine is not occurring at the moment of the lapse, since failures of knowledge 
are false to the activity itself (“you call yourself a doctor?”).  
                                                
42 PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 18 (Allan Bloom, trans. 1991). 
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 Such an account misreads mistakes in the opposite direction from Flippo 
and Cheek. In the cases, all failures of knowledge, of whatever kind, are counted 
uncritically as mistakes. For Plato’s Thrasymachus, no failure of knowledge is 
counted as a mistake, since knowledge by its very nature can never fail. Neither 
of these two extremes can be right. Mistakes are made only by competent agents, 
whose successes depend on the possibility of mistakes. That is, mistakes are, 
must be, inherent in any successful enterprise. Despite what Thrasymachus may 
say, we do “call a man who makes mistakes about the sick a doctor because of 
the very mistake he is making.” Mistakes must be possible or it would mean 
nothing to refer to a surgery (or anything for that matter) as “well done,” 
“successful,” or “correct.” Incompetent or indifferent agents do not make 
mistakes. Instead, they fumble around, their failures predictable and their 
successes dumb luck. Indeed, that only a competent, committed agent may make 
a mistake explains why it is such a good excuse.  
Although mistakes are by definition reasonable, lawyers see the matter 
differently, chalking up all wrong beliefs to mistakes, calling some reasonable 
and the rest unreasonable.43 Under such a view, unreasonable mistakes excuse, 
inter alia, attempt, theft, and burglary, and can partially excuse murder.44 
                                                
43 See Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal 
Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, 725-32 
(1983). 
44 See, e.g., People v. Braslaw, 233 Cal.App.4th 1239, 1249-51 (1st Dist. 2015). 
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According to the Model Penal Code, unreasonable mistakes are at worst reckless 
and at best negligent. In other words, actions based on faulty, poorly formed 
beliefs are partially excused under the Code. The residue of the action – that 
which is not excused – is a criticism of the agent’s belief itself. As a result, a 
killing done in the unreasonable belief that it was necessary would not be 
murder, but manslaughter (if the mistake was reckless) or negligent homicide (if 
the mistake was negligent).45  
Significantly, no Code text or commentary contains a single example of 
an unreasonable mistake.46 There is an example in a footnote borrowed from 
Glanville Williams, who identifies the self-inflicted condition of intoxication and 
any other “abnormal mental state” as the “only common situation in which a 
person makes an unreasonable mistake.” This, even though intoxication is 
already an extant, separate defense.47 Williams offers no further explanation.48  
In California, which has not adopted the Model Penal Code, an 
unreasonable mistake of fact  
is predicated upon a negligent perception of facts, not, as in the 
case of a delusion, a perception of facts not grounded in reality. A 
person acting under a delusion is not negligently interpreting actual 
                                                
45 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 3.09 & n.10 (1985). 
46 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES §§ 3.02(2), 3.04(1), & 3.09(2) 
(1985); see also Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining 
Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, 
725-32 (1983) (providing no examples of unreasonable mistakes). 
47 E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.08 (1985). 
48 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 3.09(2) n.10 (1985).  
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facts; instead, he or she is out of touch with reality. That may be 
insanity, but it is not a mistake as to any fact.49  
 
In fact, no state recognizes delusion as a defense except within a claim of 
insanity.50 When a misguided belief is not correctible by more information, the 
actions that follow are based on delusion or fantasy, not mistake. Illusions can be 
the basis of mistakes; delusions cannot. Examples of illusions include when a 
ventriloquist’s dummy appears to talk, amputees feel pain in lost limbs, or a 
straight stick looks bent in water. In these cases, it is not that something unreal is 
conjured up. That would be a delusion, as in a delusion of persecution or of 
grandeur. Because delusions are without foundation, they are a much more 
serious matter. Something is wrong – wrong with the person who has them. That 
deluded persons are impervious to more information is what makes delusions so 
serious. There is nothing wrong with someone who falls for an optical illusion. It 
is public, anyone can see it, and we can develop procedures for testing it.51 
Because “[w]e are not . . . quasi-infallible beings, who can be taken in only 
where the avoidance of mistake is completely impossible,”52 if we are not to be 
taken in, we need to be on guard. But it is no use to tell the sufferer from 
delusions to be on his guard. He needs to be cured.  
                                                
49 People. v. Mejia-Lenares, 135 Cal.App.4th 1437, 1453-54 (5th Dist. 2006). 
50 See People v. Gregory, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 776, 796-98 (5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002) 
People v. Elmore, 325 P.3d 951, 955 (Cal. 2014). 
51 J.L. AUSTIN, SENSE AND SENSIBILIA 20-23 (Oxford 1962). 
52 J.L. AUSTIN, SENSE AND SENSIBILIA 52 (Oxford 1962). 
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Even after separating the excuse of mistake from the excuse of delusion, 
borderline cases remain. For example, ghosts may be conjured up in the mind 
(delusion) or they may be just a giving-in to shadows, reflections, or a trick of 
the light (illusion). So too can we fairly characterize a mirage as either invented 
by the crazed brain of a thirsty and exhausted traveler or as an instance of 
atmospheric refraction whereby something below the horizon appears to be 
above it.53 
 If a defendant “who makes a factual mistake misperceives the objective 
circumstances,” while a “delusional defendant holds a belief that is divorced 
from the circumstances,”54 what, then, is objectively verifiable in the 
unreasonable mistake? If someone “who misjudges the external circumstances 
may show that mental disturbance” – not amounting to insanity – “contributed to 
the mistaken perception of a threat,”55 what lies between the non-excuse of 
delusion and the operative excuse of “mental disturbance”? It makes only 
misleading sense to state that such “persons operating under a mistake of fact are 
reasonable people who have simply made an unreasonable mistake.”56 Indeed, 
                                                
53 J.L. AUSTIN, SENSE AND SENSIBILIA 20-32 (Oxford 1962). 
54 People v. Elmore, 325 P.3d 951, 960 (Cal. 2014). 
55 People v. Elmore, 325 P.3d 951, 966-67 (Cal. 2014). 
56 People. v. Mejia-Lenares, 135 Cal.App.4th 1437, 1456 (5th Dist. 2006). 
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this explication of such a phenomenon has an other-worldly vibe, which if not 
just a re-description of delusion, is hard to make sense of.57  
Unsurprisingly, a solid example of an unreasonable mistake, or what  
Jerome Hall dubbed “extreme mistake,”58 has yet to show up anywhere. Even 
unrepresentative examples are few.59 Those include a home-invader “defending” 
himself therein by killing a random 79-year-old woman with a claw hammer in 
the presence of police – a self-authenticating instance of delusion, not of a 
reasonable person lapsing into unreasonably “making a mistake.”60 The home-
invader could not possibly have justifiably taken his victim as a real threat. Also 
held out as unreasonable mistakes are cases better understood as straight-up 
provocation (as where a defendant in mutual combat over the victim’s wife 
resorts to a fatal stabbing)61 or perfect self-defense (as where years of abuse 
evidenced by Battered Women’s Syndrome leads the defendant to shoot her 
sleeping abuser-husband on the very evening he had threatened to kill her).62 No 
wonder New York repudiated the unreasonable-mistake category in its version of 
                                                
57 An illustration of a claim of unreasonable mistake purporting to owe to a 
mental affliction not amounting to insanity is People v. Wells, 202 P.2d 53 (Cal. 
1949).  
58 JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 592 (2d ed. 1960). 
59 People v. Gregory, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 776, 795 (5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (citing 
cases of unreasonable mistake while upholding schizophrenic’s guilty plea).  
60 People v. Hardin, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 262 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 
61 Seidel v. Merkle1, 46 F.3d 750 (9th Cir. 1998). 
62 DePetris v. Kuykendall, 239 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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the Model Penal Code.63 Mistakes, after all, are not merely psychological, 
internal events, some reasonable, some not. Instead, they are all by nature 
reasonable lapses, which occur, are elaborated, and responded to in the public, 
observable world. Adherence to this insight is crucial to a process by which 
mistakes are assessed, the stakes  
IV. Inculpatory Mistakes 
While so far here our interest in mistakes has been in their capacity for 
excusing harm-causing action, mistakes also have point in converting harmless 
action into punishable instances of criminal attempt. Criminal attempts are 
punishable even though the intended crime is unconsummated.64 Although the 
intended crime fails because in one way or another the attempter gets caught 
before he can pull the crime off,65 the attempter remains partially on the hook, 
though less than if he had succeeded. Failure, accordingly, is a partial excuse, 
which (for the most part) mitigates punishment below that meted out for the 
successful offense.66 Attempts are said to be impossible when a criminal’s efforts 
                                                
63 People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 49-50 (N.Y. 1986); see People v. Reese, 815 
N.W.2d 85, 98-99 & 98 n.62 (Mich. 2012) (purporting to follow Vermont and 
New Jersey in repudiating imperfect self-defense). 
64 See R.A. DUFF, CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS 221-28, 363-74 (1996); Douglas Husak, 
The Nature and Justifiability of Nonconsummate Offenses,37 ARIZ. L. REV. 151 
(1995). 
65 Cf. Ira P. Robbins, Double Inchoate Crimes, 26 HARV. J. LEGIS. 1, 60-61 n.303 
(1989) (“The elements of attempted tax evasion are the same as those for tax 
evasion itself, combined only with the fact that the actor was caught.”). 
66 CAL. PENAL CODE § 664; MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(1) (Official Draft 1962). 
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fail due to factors apart from getting caught. That is, an attempt is impossible 
when the means selected for its execution are so shabby that we could have 
predicted the failure of the criminal effort even before the plan was put into 
action.67 
For example, murder is not impossible when the accused intentionally 
shoots a victim who survives through the intervention of life-saving surgery. Nor 
is theft impossible when a victim fights off the accused, who obtains no property. 
Although a thief cannot pick an empty pocket, if the thief does not know the 
pocket is empty, does that mean he has not attempted theft? No, the would-be 
thief is still punishable for attempted theft.68 Next time, the argument runs, he 
may figure out who has money and who does not. Thus, for deterrence purposes 
he should this time be only partially excused for having fallen short.69 The case 
of the failed pickpocket therefore is not a case of impossibility.70  
But what if someone intends to commit rape or murder, but fails because 
                                                
67 See Steven Shavell, Deterrence and the Punishment of Attempts, 19 J. OF 
LEGAL STUDIES 435, 451 (1990). 
68 See Commonwealth v. McDonald, 5 Cush. 365 (Mass. 1850). But see Regina 
v. Collins, 9 Cox C.C. 497 (1864), overruled by Regina v. Ring, 17 Cox C.C. 491 
(1892). 
69 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1193, 1217-18 (1985).   
70 Some have taken the position that after the fact, all attempts may be dubbed 
“impossible.” E.g., Larry Alexander, Inculpatory and Exculpatory Mistakes and 
the Fact/Law Distinction: An Essay in Memory of Myke Bayles, 12 L. & PHIL. 
33, 45 (1993); J.H. Beale, Jr., Criminal Attempts, 16 HARV. L. REV. 491, 496-97 
(1903). 
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his would-be rape or murder victim is already dead?71 Or his would-be murder 
victim is alive but sleeping in another room when the “murderer” shoots through 
a window, striking a pillow, which is taken for the victim?72 And what about 
someone who intends to take a deer out of season, but the deer turns out to be a 
stuffed decoy?73  
 The answer to each question posed above is embedded first in an answer 
to a prior question: is defendant trying to commit what really is a crime?74 If it is, 
then his failure – which manifests nothing redeeming about him – is something 
for which he deserves only partial credit: bad intention, lucky result. If he meant 
to shoot or rape a dead person (not a live one), shoot a pillow (not an enemy), or 
take a stuffed deer (not a real one) out of season, then he is not attempting 
anything.75 He is shooting or violating a corpse, shooting a pillow, or taking a 
stuffed deer, actions whose criminality, if any, has nothing to do with rape, 
murder, or preservation of deer from overzealous hunters. 
Even if defendant owns up to having tried to commit what really is a 
                                                
71 Doyle v. State, 921 P.2d 901, 911-15 (Nev. 1996) (rape), rev'd on other 
grounds by Kaczmarek v. State, 91 P.3d 16 (Nev. 2004); People v. Dlugash, 363 
N.E.2d 1155 (N.Y. 1977) (murder). 
72 State v. Mitchell, 71 S.W. 175 (Mo. 1902). 
73 State v. Guffey, 1953 262 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953). 
74 GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 3.3., at 178 (1978). 
75 See People v. Rojas, 358 P.2d 921 (Cal. 1961); Ken Levy, It’s Not Too 
Difficult: A Plea to Resurrect the Impossibility Defense, 45 N.M. L. REV. 225, 
254-57 (2014). 
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crime, there must – because of the limits of what it means to fail due to a mistake 
– be some instances where he should get off scot-free. Those limits explain how 
the term “impossibility” insinuated itself into the law of attempt: blame has no 
place when the prohibited harm never had a chance to occur. As such, an 
impossible plan (if plan there be) lacks the proximity to success that justifies a 
conviction of attempt. Success is impossible when these would-be thieves, 
rapists, murderers, and scofflaw hunters go about things in such an unlikely way 
as to make their failure the inevitable upshot of delusion or fantasy, not 
mistake.76 They give us doubt about whether they intended to commit a crime or 
take the requisite “substantial”77 or “direct but ineffectual”78 step toward its 
completion. Though they well may need some sort of reprogramming or 
warehousing, because they are too disconnected from reality to have “made a 
mistake,” they are not to be dealt with in the same way we deal with fully 
responsible agents who barely fall short of the harms they threaten.79 
For example, what are the conditions under which someone could think a 
decoy deer is a real deer? A convincing decoy deer in the woods staged there by 
                                                
76 See MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 5.01, at 314-15 (1985) (calling 
“the relative appropriateness of means to end” an “important aspect of the 
impossibility problem”). 
77 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c) (Official Draft 1962). 
78 People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 701, 704 (Cal. 1983). 
79 John Hasnas, Once More unto the Breach: The Inherent Liberalism of the 
Criminal Law and Liability for Attempting the Impossible, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 
41 (2002). 
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the game warden should lead to the conviction of someone who shoots at it of 
attempting to take a deer out of season: 
The State’s evidence shows that conservation agents, about two 
weeks before the alleged offense, had procured the hide of a 2½ 
year old doe which had been killed by an automobile in Pulaski 
County. They had taken it to a taxidermist, who soaked it to soften 
it, stuffed it with excelsior and boards, inserted rods in the legs so it 
would stand upright and used the doe’s skull in the head part of the 
hide so it would hold its former shape. For eyes, which had not 
been preserved, two small circular pieces of scotchlight reflector 
tape of a ‘white to amber color’, had been placed over the eyeless 
sockets.80 
 
The Missouri statute which conservation agents sought to enforce criminalized 
unauthorized pursuit, taking, killing, possession, or disposing of all wildlife, not 
just deer.81 In fact, defendants were in search of a wolf they saw run across a 
road they took en route to a frog-hunting expedition.82 Thus they attempted to 
take a wolf out of season by shooting at a decoy deer that they took – on these 
facts justifiably – for a wolf. But move the decoy deer to the end of a grocery-
store aisle or any other place where deer are unlikely to appear, or lower the 
quality of the decoy so that it looks fake from any distance, and a conviction of 
attempt becomes manifestly absurd.83  
                                                
80 State v. Guffey, 262 S.W.2d 152, 153 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953). 
81 State v. Guffey, 262 S.W.2d 152, 152-53 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953), quoting 
VERNON’S ANNOTATED MISSOURI STATUTES § 252.040. 
82 State v. Guffey, 262 S.W.2d 152, 154 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953). 
83 Cf. GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW§ 3.3, at 151-52 (1978) 
(attempt liability in Guffey should turn on “how deceptive the dummy was”). 
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 Of course the deer was not in a grocery-store aisle, but staged in a place 
and manner where anyone might be taken in and mistaken it for live, off-limits 
wildlife. This makes it all the more remarkable that Guffey’s conviction of 
attempt was reversed. To the appellate court, Guffey’s project was not an illegal 
attempt to take protected wildlife, but a perfectly legal taking of an unprotected 
stuffed deer by way of a shotgun blast. Because by his own account Guffey took 
the stuffed decoy for alive, it is hard to locate the appellate court’s ruling within 
any notion of attempt, impossible or otherwise.84 
As for shooting a pillow, we would need thorough knowledge of the 
episode: did the enemy really resemble a pillow? In the actual case where 
defendant Newton Mitchell’s conviction of attempted murder of John O. Warren 
was upheld by Missouri’s high court, Mitchell, who had known Warren at least 
20 years, had at one time boarded at Warren’s house where the attempt occurred, 
thus educating himself on the layout. Moreover, when he shot twice through the 
window at the downstairs bed (one shot striking the pillow, the other the dresser), 
Mitchell was unaware that Warren, who had seen Mitchell and another man 
skulking around his grounds, had taken the precaution of retiring to the upstairs 
where his wife and children slept. Plus, Mitchell had a well-publicized motive for 
the attack: he fancied Warren’s wife, whom he had pledged, apparently without 
                                                
84 See Ken Levy, It’s Not Too Difficult: A Plea to Resurrect the Impossibility Defense, 
45 N.M. L. REV. 225, 258 (2014) (Guffey “is deeply flawed”). 
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encouragement, to extricate from her marriage by any means necessary.85 There 
is nothing impossible about that attempt.  
J.L. Austin once put to students in a seminar at Harvard: “if a man hacks 
away with an axe at a pile of logs under the bedclothes, thinking it to be a man in 
his bed, isn’t this attempted murder, despite the fact that the courts hold that it is 
not?”86 Austin’s question was rhetorical. After all, elsewhere he criticized a judge 
whose instructions to the jury made the defendant, by comparison, stand out as 
an “evident master of the Queen’s English.” As for the judge, 
he probably manages to convey his meaning somehow or other. 
Judges seem to acquire a knack of conveying meaning, and even 
carrying conviction, through the use of a pithy Anglo-Saxon which 
sometimes has literally no meaning at all. Wishing to distinguish 
the case of shooting at a post in the belief that it was an enemy, as 
not an ‘attempt,’ from the case of picking an empty pocket in the 
belief that money was in it, which is an ‘attempt’, the judge 
explains that in shooting at the post ‘the man is never on the thing 
at all.’87 
 
Austin is right: the expression may be meaningless at the literal level, but the 
judge does manage to get his point across somehow. What would make the man 
                                                
85 State v. Mitchell, 71 S.W. 175, 177-78 (Mo. 1902). 
86 George Pitcher, Austin: A Personal Memoir, in ESSAYS ON J.L. AUSTIN 20 
(Oxford 1973); cf. JAMES FITZ-JAMES STEPHEN, DIGEST OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 
53 (7th ed. 1926) (“If A, mistaking a log of wood for B, and intending to murder 
B, strikes the log of wood with an axe, A has not attempted to murder B.”). 
87 J.L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 197 n.1 (3d ed. 
1979) (italics added); cf. Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 48 N.E. 770, 770 (Mass. 
1897) (Holmes, J.) (referring to “the classic instance of shooting at a post 
supposed to be a man” as no attempt). 
	 26	
take a post for an enemy, anyway? Without good grounds for taking the one for 
the other, the man “is never on the thing at all,” the “thing” being the successful 
shooting of an enemy, a risk so remote that the man is never “on” it. His means 
(shooting at a post) are so poorly selected for the desired ends (shooting a man) 
that success is too unlikely from the get-go to treat the project as a serious 
attempt. There is something wrong with him, not with what he saw; he is not 
mistaken (missing a bit of information), but delusional (at odds with reality). 
Before we could consider this shooting an attempted murder, we would need to 
know more about the incident, more than the stick-figure sketch that Austin – a 
lover of facts – gave us.88 Only then could we be in a position to say that the man 
had a basis for taking the post for an enemy; only then could we be in a position 
to say that in shooting at the post “by mistake” did he attempt to kill a man. 
Another way of saying this is that we can imagine situations in which 
shooting a post would be an attempt, just as we can imagine situations in which 
shooting a stuffed deer (in, say, the grocery store) would not be an “attempt to 
take a deer.” For example, shooting a bare post sticking in the ground from three 
feet is not an attempt to commit murder, though it may conceivably be an attempt 
to commit murder to shoot a very realistic scarecrow from 50 yards. What we 
                                                
88 For example, in Donald Siegel’s 1979 film Escape from Alcatraz, lifer Frank 
Morris (played by Clint Eastwood) masked his prison escape by arranging his 
bedding, replete with papier-mâché head, in a way that justifiably persuaded the 
night guard peering into the cell with a flashlight that he was asleep therein. 
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need is a process for distinguishing the one from the other.  
And what would be the conditions under which one could take a dead 
person for a live one? Narrow indeed, such as when the would-be killer, without 
checking for signs of life, shoots a man in the head with a .32 a few minutes after 
the man had died from shots to the chest by another person with a .38.89  
But how, exactly, could someone sexually penetrate a dead person, taken 
for alive? Consider in this vein United States v. Thomas,90 where McClellan (a 
Navy airman, age 19) began dancing at a bar with a young woman he had just 
met when she promptly collapsed on the dance floor, dead from “acute interstitial 
myocarditis,” a heart disease.91 With help from Thomas (a Navy airman, age 20) 
and Abruzzese (a Navy airman, age 18), McClellan loaded the woman in his car, 
where he recommended they violate her because she “was just drunk” and 
“would never know the difference.”92 After all three took their exploitive turn 
therein, McClellan and Thomas dropped off Abruzzese at the USO before taking 
the woman to a gas station,93 where an attendant called police, who arrived soon 
after and declared her dead.94 Because evidence indicated she had died on the 
                                                
89 See People v. Dlugash, 363 N.E.2d 1155 (N.Y. 1977). 
90 United States v. Thomas, 13 USCMA 278 (1962). 
91 United States v. Thomas, 13 USCMA 278, 280 (1962). 
92 United States v. Thomas, 13 USCMA 278, 280 (1962). 
93 Abruzzese flipped, testifying for the prosecution in exchange for dropped 
charges. See United States v. Thomas, 13 USCMA 278, 280 (1962). 
94 United States v. Thomas, 13 USCMA 278, 280 (1962). 
	 28	
dance floor, rape was precluded.95 Convictions of attempted rape, however, were 
upheld on the ground that defendants took the deceased for alive when they 
penetrated her.96 
In two opinions taking up 22 pages in the Court Martial Reports, the only 
allusion to what led defendants to think the deceased was alive is the coroner’s 
remark that rigor mortis had not set in before the multiple penetrations.97 That 
offhand remark, however, is a weak basis for concluding that defendants made a 
mistake about life and death. Can the line between the two states be that fine? 
The whole thing seems fishy, too fantastic to count as a mistake. As “sordid and 
revolting a picture” of human action as it is,98 Thomas does not bespeak an 
attempt, not without more than the scant factual development that the court 
provides.  
Violating a corpse is a perversion quite apart from anything like real rape. 
In fact, someone who violates a corpse very likely does so because the person is 
dead (“and I will kill thee, and love thee after”).99 Such an action should provoke 
negative reaction sure enough, but not the same as to someone who has put 
himself to commit rape and failed due to, say, resistance on the would-be 
                                                
95 United States v. Thomas, 13 USCMA 278, 280-81 (1962). 
96 United States v. Thomas, 13 USCMA 278, 280-81, 292 (1962). 
97 United States v. Thomas, 13 USCMA 278, 280 (1962). 
98 United States v. Thomas, 13 USCMA 278, 280 (1962). 
99 OTHELLO 5.2.18-19 (David Bevington ed.) (New York: Bantam 1988). 
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survivor’s part.100  
One could conceivably take a barely dead person for a barely live person 
on facts like those of Doyle v. State,101 where three men had intercourse with a 
profoundly intoxicated 20-year-old woman, who then threatened to accuse them 
of rape before being kidnapped to an area outside Las Vegas and murdered. 
Either just before or just after she expired from being choked, beaten, and 
smashed in the face with a brick, a four-inch twig was inserted in her rectum.102 
To conspiracy, kidnapping, and murder charges was consequently added sexual 
assault, Doyle’s conviction of which was reversed for lack of proof as to whether 
penetration with the foreign object occurred before death.103 Although Nevada is 
among those states that condition rape on a live victim,104 the state high court 
noted in dictum that felony murder may be predicated on attempted rape, which 
may lie when a would-be rapist justifiably takes a barely dead victim for alive.105 
                                                
100 E.g., State v. Martinez, 230 P. 379, 383 (N.M. 1924); cf. Waters v. State, 234 
A.2d 147, 153-54 (Md. Spec. Ct. App. 1967) (upholding attempted-rape 
conviction of 80-year-old who doubted his capacity to achieve erection). 
101 Doyle v. State, 921 P.2d 901 (Nev. 1996), rev’d on other grounds by 
Kaczmarek v. State, 91 P.3d 16 (Nev. 2004). 
102 Doyle v. State, 921 P.2d 901, 905-907 (Nev. 1996). 
103 Doyle v. State, 921 P.2d 901, 912-915 (Nev. 1996).  
104 Doyle v. State, 921 P.2d 901, 912-13 & 913 n.6 (Nev. 1996). For rulings that 
the death of the victim prior to penetration does not necessarily preclude a 
conviction of rape, see People v. Gomez, 959 N.E.2d 1178 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) 
and State v. Collins, 585 N.E.2d 532 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990). 
105 Doyle v. State, 921 P.2d 901, 914 (Nev. 1996), citing NEVADA REVISED 
STATUTES ANNOTATED § 200.030(1)(b). But see Nay v. State, 167 P.3d 430, 435 
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This distinction – between earnest and stillborn gestures, between failures 
owing to mistake (attempts) and delusion (non-attempts) – is what the Model 
Penal Code trades on when holding that attempt law should not punish persons 
who demonstrate insufficient “dangerousness.” For the Code drafters, “[t]he 
innocuous character of the particular conduct becomes relevant only if the futile 
endeavor itself indicates a harmless personality, so that immunizing the conduct 
from liability would not result in exposing society to a dangerous person.”106 The 
Code cites “black magic” (aka voodoo) as a means that indicates non-
dangerousness,107 at once acknowledging that “it is by no means clear that those 
who make unreasonable mistakes will not be potentially dangerous.”108 Indeed, 
anyone out of touch enough to take just any old pillow for a person may in fact 
be dangerous.109 Dangerous or not, no progress can be made by declaring, as 
many do, the “black magic” scenario a mistake.110 
                                                
(Nev. 2007) (“Robbery does not support felony murder where the evidence 
shows that the accused kills a person and only later forms the intent to rob….”). 
106 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 5.01, at 316 (1985).   
107 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 5.01, at 316 n.88 (1985). 
108 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 5.01, at 316 n.88 (1985) (italics 
added). 
109 Cf. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 27.07, at 401 (7th 
ed. 2015) (a misguided agent “may later commit some other irrational and 
dangerous act, or such a person may come upon a more sensible way to 
accomplish her criminal task”). 
110 See, e.g., Peter Westen, Impossibility Attempts: A Speculative Thesis, 5 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 523, 535-36 (2008). 
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Black magic has nonetheless become a “stock example” of the staying 
power of the impossibility defense, despite the universally held official position 
that impossibility is no longer a defense to a charge of attempt.111 As a clear and 
high example of a stillborn attempt, these cases of “incantations”112 are deployed 
by courts and commentators to demonstrate “some validity to decisions that 
distinguish the tree stump from the empty pocket case.”113 Accordingly, 
exertions that are “inapt”114 or “doomed”115 “ex ante”116 – where failure is an 
“intrinsic”117 or “inherent”118 feature of an “unreasonable”119 criminal design that 
                                                
111  Larry Alexander, Inculpatory and Exculpatory Mistakes and the Fact/Law 
Distinction: An Essay in Memory of Myke Bayles, 12 L. & PHIL. 33, 48 n.40 
(1993) (citing sources). 
112 Sanford H. Kadish, Foreword: The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 
84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679, 685 (1994). 
113 Jerome Hall, Criminal Attempt – A Study of Foundations of Criminal 
Liability, 49 YALE L.J. 789, 836 (1940). 
114 GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 3.3, 149-52 & n.59 
(1978). 
115 H.L.A. Hart, The House of Lords on Attempting the Impossible, in ESSAYS IN 
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 367, 372 (1983). 
116 Steven Shavell, Deterrence and the Punishment of Attempts, 19 J. OF LEGAL 
STUDIES 435, 451 (1990). 
117 John S. Strahorn, The Effect of Impossibility on Criminal Attempts, 78 U. PA. 
L. REV. 962, 971-78 (1930). 
118 See Douglas Husak, Why Punish Attempts at All? Yaffe on the “Transfer 
Principle,” 6 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 399, 405 (2012); MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(2) 
(Official Draft 1962). 
119 Kyle Brodie, The Obviously Impossible Attempt, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 237, 
252-56 (1995). 
	 32	
is too unlikely in a causation-sense to amount to much120 – are feeble gestures, 
not criminal attempts. The method by which this exemption from the law of 
attempt is explicated, however, devolves too often into whacky,121 admittedly 
“ridiculous”122 hypotheticals, which, while entertaining to a point, cut us off from 
our principal job of decoding what was done: from the factual background of the 
incident or why of it all.  
Why hypotheticals (Sanford Kadish’s “Mr. Law and Mr. Fact” comes to 
mind)123 are substituted for the abundant real-life criminal cases on hand is 
opaque. The stick-figure nature of the hypotheticals boils things down sure 
enough, but the upshot of this activity does more harm than good by impeding 
assessments of whether a mistake has been made.124 
Take, for example, Clarissa, a cheated-on spouse who, after enduring “the 
final straw, . . . stirs what she believes to be a spoonful of the arsenic she had 
                                                
120 Ken Levy, It’s Not Too Difficult: A Plea to Resurrect the Impossibility 
Defense, 45 N.M. L. REV. 225, 265-74 (2014). 
121 E.g., State v. Logan, 656 P.2d 777, 779 (Kan. 1983) (“trying to sink a 
battleship with a pop-gun”); Ken Levy, It’s Not Too Difficult: A Plea to 
Resurrect the Impossibility Defense, 45 N.M. L. REV. 225, 229 (2014) 
(attempting to violate Anti-Tongue-Sticking-Out law).  
122 Kevin Cole, The Voodoo We Do: Harm, Impossibility, and the Reductionist 
Impulse, 1994 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 31, 53-54. 
123 SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
PROCESSES 599 (7th ed. 2001). 
124 But cf. LEO KATZ, BAD ACTS AND GUILTY MINDS 276-93 (1987) (14-page 
hypothetical impossibility case, which includes separate appellate “opinions”). 
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purchased for this eventuality into his coffee,” only to realize “that she 
mistakenly added sugar to his coffee, just as she does every morning.”125 As an 
act of repentance, Clarissa then turns herself in, apparently as attempted 
murderer.126  
On that lean backstory, frankly, it is hard to have any reaction at all to 
Clarissa. We are to take it as given she “mistakenly” took sugar for poison. But 
how? Any amateur student of the mind would conclude that Clarissa did not 
want her husband dead (not, at least, by her own hand). Imagine the trembling 
hands, racing mind, and complex of emotions leading up to the contemplated act. 
If genuinely committed to doing him in, what went wrong? Did someone switch 
the sugar and arsenic containers? Did Clarissa have two identical containers side 
by side with no distinguishing markings and guess which was the deadly one? 
What kind of murderer does that? No mistake occurs where no precautions are 
taken.127 That she would turn herself in manifests a justifiably guilty conscience, 
but at the level of action she “was never on the thing at all.”128 
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126 John Hasnas, Once More unto the Breach: The Inherent Liberalism of the 
Criminal Law and Liability for Attempting the Impossible, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 2 
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John Hasnas finds this bare-bones hypothetical “apparently derived from” 
State v. Clarissa,129 which he characterizes as a “classically illustrative . . . . case 
in which a slave attempted to poison her master with an innocuous substance.”130 
George Fletcher concurs with that characterization.131 In the real case, the real 
Clarissa dropped two ounces of Jamestown (aka Jimson) weed in the coffee of 
two “free white persons,” one her “overseer” Nelson Parsons, who consequently 
found himself “so near dying,” but not dead.132 Due to an inartfully pled 
indictment and an inadmissible confession that Parsons coerced from Clarissa, 
her capital conviction of “‘attempt to poison’ a white person” was reversed.133  
But this much is clear: Jamestown weed is no innocuous substance, 
understood both then and now as deadly if administered in more than medicinal 
doses.134 Clarissa might have made a mistake pure and simple in the dosage, or 
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131 See George P. Fletcher, The Metamorphosis of Larceny, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
469, 522 (1976) (citing State v. Clarissa for the proposition that “putting sugar in 
an intended victim’s tea was not criminal”). 
132 State v. Clarissa, 11 Ala. 57, 59-62 (1847). 
133 See State v. Clarissa, 11 Ala. 57, 62 (1847) (ruling that deadly properties of 
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maybe Parsons had a stocky constitution, but her efforts were far from doomed 
ex ante, quite apart from whether Parsons had it coming to him. In this respect 
does Clarissa’s actual litigation get us much closer than the “classic” 
hypothetical version to discovery or agreement about both the basis of her 
mistake (if mistake there be) and what to do about it.  
V. Conclusion 
Nothing is more central to the understanding of untoward human action 
than the operation of mistakes. And nothing is more conventional than the notion 
that mistakes may be unreasonable, even “extreme.”135 Indeed, Richard Singer 
wrote about “unreasonable mistakes” for 84 pages in the Boston College Law 
Review, tracing their operation in law back to Blackstone,136 yet without pausing 
to consider whether all wrong beliefs, whatever their foundation, can constitute 
mistakes. If I have succeeded at all here, then I have made a case for the idea that 
they cannot. Because mistakes are tied to the public observable world and not to 
the inner world of privacy and psychology, they are by definition reasonable. 
When someone able to take the right one takes the wrong one when trying to get 
it right, a mistake occurs, which is to say terms like negligence and recklessness 
have no specific application to what was done. Mistakes may either exculpate or 
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inculpate when competently pled. Delusions, oppositely, may have some place in 
the law, but they bear no relation to the meaning and operation of mistakes.  
If we are any closer to discovery or agreement about the meaning and 
operation of mistakes, then so too are we at once closer to discovery or 
agreement about a tension between the punishment of excessive risk-taking as 
opposed to harm-causing, that is, a tension between the role of luck and desserts 
in ascriptions of responsibility. And these are serious matters. 
 
